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Purpose – This article studies the effects of disclosure practices of Japanese IPO prospectuses on 
long-term stock performance and bid-ask spread, as a proxy for cost of capital, after a company is 
admitted to the stock exchange.  
Design/methodology/approach – A disclosure index methodology is applied on 120 IPO 
prospectuses from 2003 to define the nature and extent of the disclosures concerning intellectual 
capital in order to study the effects of information asymmetries on stock price valuation. 
Findings – Intellectual capital information leads to significantly better long-term performance 
against a reference portfolio, and is thus important to the capital market. Further, superior disclosure 
of IC reduces bid-ask spread in the long-term, indicating that such disclosures are important in an 
IPO setting 
Research limitations/implications – There are some limitations to the findings. The data presented 
here reflects only one year of IPO’s on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Therefore, the results must be 
read with some caution, as the stock market environment in the particular year, 2003, may not 
reflect that of a normal “over the cycle” year.   
Practical implications – Analysts and investors can attain higher long-term returns by 
understanding IC. Therefore, it seems to be contradictory that their interest in IC disclosure is so 
low.  
Originality/value – This article is the first one to discuss interrelations between voluntary 
disclosure practices and the long-term effects of information asymmetry in the Japanese context.  
 
Keywords: Voluntary disclosures, intellectual capital, IPO prospectuses, long-term performance, 
bid-ask spread, cost of capital, Japan 
Paper type: Research paper 
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1. Introduction	  
The efficient functioning of capital markets is dependent upon information flows between 
companies and investors, either directly or indirectly through financial intermediaries e.g. analysts. 
Information reduces investors’ perceived risk when predicting a company’s future performance. 
Information asymmetry will always be present to some extent, as investors never have the same 
information as the top management team in a company. However, but good information disclosure 
practices have been shown to be advantageous both from investor and company perspectives.  
In the last couple decades it has been hypothesized that accounting information is, although 
probably still the most important information, insufficient for investors and analysts when they are 
seeking to value companies. Furthermore, it has been indicated that this insufficiency is especially 
problematic when a company is unknown to the investor, i.e. not previously been publically traded. 
The ability to attract capital is vital for many industrial sectors today. Information disclosure can 
reduce the perceived risk of the investors. Therefore, this article studies disclosures made during the 
IPO process,  where building investors’ knowledge of the company is very active.  
Studying voluntary disclosures in IPO prospectuses has a two-fold significance. It is not just crucial 
for academia, but also for stakeholders on the financial markets. Firstly, companies need to 
continuously pursue enhanced disclosure practices by minimizing, prioritizing and structuring the 
corporate information in relation to strategy, value creation, intellectual capital (IC) as well as 
environmental, social and governance factors. This is important because they are competing for 
attention in a global information environment addressing a multitude of different stakeholders that 
potentially will take interest in the message being conveyed. Secondly, a better understanding of 
which types of voluntary information disclosure that focus on valuation processes will positively 
affect the functioning of the capital markets by increasing transparency and decreasing information 
asymmetry (Jenkinson and Ljungquist, 2001).  
The effects of voluntary disclosure in IPO prospectuses have been examined noticeably in recent 
years. Studies show that improved disclosure practices are good proxies for reducing ex ante 
uncertainty,e.g. information asymmetry (Jenkinson and Ljungquist, 2001). Of course, there exist a 
number of other metrics that may affect the stock price performance of new listings, e.g. retained 
ownership (Jog and McConomy, 2003), disclosure of earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses 
(Clarkson and Merkley, 1994) and underwriter reputation (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). However, 
these factors are outside the main focus of this paper.  
Schrand and Verrecchia (2004) argue that information asymmetry between corporate management 
and the financial markets at the time of the IPO lead to higher costs of capital. They argue that 
companies literally can apply voluntary disclosure as a tool to reduce these costs. Further, they find 
disclosure to be negatively associated with bid-ask spread as a proxy for a company’s cost of 
capital. In the light of the findings of Schrand and Verrecchia (2004), this study therefore examines 
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the long-term stock price performance effects of intellectual capital disclosures on a sample of 
companies that were introduced to the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 2003.  
 
Why	  is	  Japan	  an	  interesting	  disclosure-­‐case	  to	  study?	  
Voluntary disclosure practices in Japanese annual reports.had been studied at a time where Japanese 
industrial practices were forefront in production management (e.g. Cooke 1991). However, Japan’s 
leadership in knowledge management and intellectual capital seems to have been caught up by the 
rest of the industrialized world in the last 15-20 years in line with the leading stock market index the 
Nikkei.  
The timing of our dataset corresponds with a rising focus on managing knowledge and intellectual 
capital from a government perspective. Under the auspices of the Japanese Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (METI)  the “Intellectual Asset-based Management” (IAbM) guidelines were 
developed in October 2005. Additionally, METI started to play a central role in the World 
Intellectual Capital Initiative.  
Although Japan historically has been strongly associated with the knowledge-society, Japanese 
studies regarding the importance of voluntary disclosure for the capital market have been very 
scarce. Aspects of Japanese IPO performance have previously been examined by Dawson and 
Hiraki (1985), Pettway and Kaneko (1996), and more recently by Pettway, Thosar and Walker 
(2008). To the authors’ knowledge of this article, only one previous paper has examined the 
informational effects of the voluntary disclosures included in Japanese IPO prospectuses (Rimmel, 
Nielsen and Yosano, 2009). Therefore, the contribution of this study is to examine the effects of 
voluntary disclosures on intellectual capital and strategy on the underpricing of the stock price 
subsequent to the introduction on the stock exchange as well as the companies’ cost-of-capital.  
There are some limitations to the findings of this study. The data presented reflects only one year of 
IPO’s on the Nikkei Stock Exchange. Hence, the results must be read with some caution. The stock 
market environment in 2003 may not reflect that of a normal “over the business cycle” year. In 
2001 book building1 was a considerably more applied method than other possible auction methods 
for IPO’s in Japan. Consequently, market participants may have acted differently as otherwise or 
still in accordance with old rules of thumb.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical foundations 
of the study and leads to the formulation of the hypotheses concerning IPO’s underpricing and cost 
of capital measured as bid-ask spread in stock across time. In section 3, the applied research 
                                                
1 In book building the underwriter seeks indications of interest from investors and sets a minimum and maximum price 
for the IPO. Institutional investors submit nonbinding price and quantity indications to the underwriter. The 
underwriter, in selecting the final offer price, can accept the quantity indications above the price and sells any remaining 
shares to the public (Kutsuna & Smith, pp. 1130-1140). 
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methods are explained, while section 4 contains the results of our analysis. Finally, the discussion 
and concluding remarks are contained in section 5.  
 
2. Disclosure	  effects	  on	  initial	  valuation	  and	  cost	  of	  capital	  	  
Voluntary disclosures are expected to lower the cost of equity capital (see Verrecchia 2001) because 
increased disclosure reduces information asymmetry and to enhance stock market liquidity by 
increasing the demand for a company’s stocks. (Botosan, 1997; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). 
This in turn, may facilitate a more precise valuation of the company. Both Botosan (1997) and 
Richardson and Welker (2001) confirm that the quantity and quality of disclosure is negatively 
related to the cost of equity capital for companies. 
The academic literature is rich with contributions on IPO valuation (cf. Kim and Ritter 1999) 
examining IPO’s long-term performance and their industrial sectors (Akhigbe et al. 2006). In Asia, 
especially the Chinese (cf. Kao et al. 2009, Wang 2004) and Japanese (cf. Yamamoto 2009, Nagata 
and Rhee 2009, Kutsuna et al. 2002) stock markets have recently been under scrutiny with regards 
to the performance related characteristics of IPO’s. A specific stream of research has studied how 
informativeness of the IPO prospectus affect pricing of the IPOs.by examining characteristics of 
intellectual capital disclosures (e.g. Bukh et al., 2005; Cordazzo, 2007; Xu and Xu, 2012) as well as 
on general information disclosure in the prospectus (Ström, 2006).. In an Asian setting, Singh and 
Van der Zahn (2007) found a positive association between underpricing and the extent of 
intellectual capital disclosures in Singaporean IPO prospectuses.  
In the wake of this specific stream of literature, this study focuses on the performance related 
effects of voluntary disclosure levels of intellectual capital in Japanese IPO prospectuses and thus 
there lies a practical contribution in examining whether certain types of information helps Japanese 
investors in picking the stocks with the best possible long-term performance. Subsequently, a 
discussion outlines aspects of long-term performance and bid-ask spread in relation to voluntary 
disclosure in IPO’s to develop this study’s hypothesis. 
2.1	  	   Long-­‐term	  performance	  of	  the	  stock	  	  
A substantial body of research conducted from an information-economics perspective has concen-
trated on studying why companies disclose more information than is required by regulation (cf. 
Jenkinson and Ljungquist, 2001).  
Long-term performance of IPO’s has been the subject of much research in recent years. A thorough 
review of this literature can be found in Ritter (1991), who also finds evidence that IPO’s 
substantially under-perform a sample of matching firms from the closing price on the first day of 
public trading to their three-year anniversaries (about 29% in the three year period after their 
launch). Most long-term performance studies of IPO’s have been conducted in the US and generally 
companies underperform the market benchmarks. For example, Rajan and Servaes (1997) showed 
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that in the long-term IPO’s underperformed the market by between 17% and 47%. Additionally, 
Carter et al. (1998) showed that US firms underperformed the market by 19,9%. In the UK, , 
Kurshed et al. (1999) documented long-term underperformance of 17,8% using IPO’s on the 
London Main Market from 1991-95. 
Although US and UK studies reveal strikingly similar results, Kurshed et al. (1999) provide a brief 
review of the field, indicating that there are differences across countries. The degree of under-
performance was found to be highest in Australia, namely 51,0 % (Lee et al. 1994) while Brazil 
follows with 47,0 % (Aggarwal et al., 1993). Although underperformance seems to be the norm, 
some exceptions do exist. Country specific studies in Korea by Kim et al. (1995) and Sweden by 
Loughran et al. (1994) has shown that IPO companies outperformed the market by 91,6 % and 1,2 
% respectively. Therefore, it is interesting to study this in the Japanese context, as Rimmel et al. 
(2009) showed that there is some ambivalence. 
Typical explanatory factors of long-term performance include: underwriters’ reputation (Carter et 
al., 1998; Michaely and Shaw, 1994), ownership structure (Jain and Kini, 1994, 1999, 2000; 
Kutsuna et al. 2002), the pre-IPO performance of a company (Kurshed et al,. 1999), degree of 
multinationality of a company (Kurshed et al., 1999) and industry differences (Brown, 1999; 
Ahmad-Zaluki et al., 2009).  
In relation to this study’s focus on intellectual capital disclosure in IPO prospectuses, Bessler and 
Bittelmeyer (2008) find that innovation, patents, and intellectual capital are important factors that 
have a positive impact on the valuation and on the long-run financial performance of especially 
young technology firms. Guo et al. (2005) find similar evidence, R&D-intensity is positively related 
to both long-term performance and underpricing., There exist a multitude of studies concerning the 
value relevance of innovations and patents (cf. Al-Horani et al., 2003; Deng et al., 1999; Hirschey 
and Richardson, 2004).  
For that reason, it can be expected that companies who disclose substantial amounts of information 
on intellectual capital will be associated with better transparency and therefore also better long-term 
performance.  
H1a:  The extent of voluntary disclosure in the IPO prospectus is positively associated with 
the long-term performance of the stock price 
H1b:  The nature of voluntary disclosure in the IPO prospectuses does not affect the long-
term performance of the stock price equally 
 
2.2	   Bid-­‐ask	  spread	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  cost	  of	  capital	  	  
The previous section outlined that good disclosure practices leading up to the IPO is expected to 
affect investors’ perceptions of the stock price value. This is because good disclosure practices 
reduce information asymmetry between company management and the investors (e.g. Joshi et al., 
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2012; Lin et al., 2012). Coller and Yohn (1997) conclude that better corporate disclosure leads to 
lower information asymmetry, which in turn reduce the ex ante uncertainty and thus both 
underpricing and bid-ask spreads. Such good disclosure practices with positive results on reducing 
information asymmetry may relate to the amount of information contained in the IPO prospectus 
(Cordazzo, 2007), the inclusion of voluntary information on risk factors (Beatty and Ritter, 1986) or 
e.g. management forecasts (Jog and McConomy, 2003). 
Adverse selection theory states that information asymmetry between company management and the 
capital market manifests itself in the form of reduced liquidity in relation to the company’s stocks 
(see Michaely and Shaw (1994) for a thorough review of adverse selection models). The effect of 
this would be that in order to convince investors to buy stocks in firms with lower levels of 
liquidity, the companies will be forced to release stocks with a discount, thereby creating a higher 
cost of capital. According to Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) the company can reduce its cost of 
capital by increasing the amount of information disclosed because this will increase interest in the 
stock and thereby also its liquidity. The bid-ask spread is a measure of liquidity companies’ shares 
and is in this study applied to examine the relationship between cost-of-capital and disclosure 
levels.  
There are a number of studies that attempt to link disclosure levels to cost of capital. Welker (1995) 
e.g. concludes that disclosure levels reduce information asymmetry and increases stock liquidity. 
Botosan (1997) expands this result by establishing that the above relationship between disclosure 
level and cost of capital is especially present for companies with infrequent analyst following. Both 
Healy et al. (1999) as well as Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) indicate similar conclusions. Although 
applying bid-ask spreads as a proxy for cost-of-capital this may not be as clean a measure as 
underpricing (Schrand and Verrecchia, 2004). Therefore, this study applied this variable as its 
strength is related to illustrating developments in information asymmetry over time.  
The hypothesis is divided into an a and a b version. The a version of the hypotheses concerns the 
total extent of voluntary disclosure captured by applying the disclosure index. The b version 
concerns the nature of the voluntary disclosure captured by our disclosure index in the sense that it 
looks at differences according to the specific types of information that is disclosed:  
H2a:  The extent of voluntary disclosure in the IPO prospectus is inversely associated with 
the bid-ask spread 
H2b:  The nature of voluntary disclosure in the IPO prospectuses does not affect the bid-
ask spread equally 
The next section describes the construction of the disclosure index and the statistical tests applied to 
analyze the data. 
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3. Research	  method	  
There is an extensive amount of accounting literature concerned with providing frameworks for the 
study of the nature and extent of corporate disclosure (cf. Adrem, 1999; Cooke, 1989; Rimmel, 
2004). The most frequently applied frameworks divide corporate disclosures into the categories 
mandatory disclosure studies (Wallace et al. 1994), voluntary disclosure studies (Gray et al., 1995; 
Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Hossain et al,. 1994) and disclosure studies that consider both mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure items (Beattie et al,. 2002; Inchausti, 1997). Rather than considering 
whether a piece of information is mandatory or not, the present study focuses on the effect of all the 
types of information contained in the narrative sections of the IPO prospectus, in turn arguing that 
the value relevance of information must be seen from the user’s perspective.  
 
3.1	   The	  disclosure	  index	  
This study applies a disclosure index for the quantification of information levels disclosed in IPO 
prospectuses. Following a common path of previous disclosure index studies, this study conducts a 
replication of the disclosure index used in a number of recent disclosure studies of IPO prospectuses 
by Bukh et al. (2005) in relation to Danish IPO prospectuses, Italian IPO prospectuses (Cordazzo, 
2007), Japanese IPO prospectuses (Rimmel et al., 2009) and Singaporean IPO prospectuses (Singh 
and Van der Zahn, 2007).  
The particular research design was chosen for our study because application of the disclosure index 
approach on an IPO prospectus represents a proxy for the quality of the information level that the 
company supplies to the capital market in connection with the IPO (Bukh et al., 2005). When 
applying such an approach, it is, however, important to consider the reliability of the results and the 
objectivity of the study (Unerman, 2000).  
In the present study, these criteria are handled through a thorough literature review of underpricing 
and bid-ask spread studies, clear instructions in the coding process and verifying the coding through 
separate coding by multiple researchers (cf. .Jones, 1994; Beattie, Mc Innes and Fearnley, 2004; 
Clathworthy and Jones, 2006). Beattie et al. (2004) argue that the amount of disclosure might not be 
an exact indicator of disclosure quality. The disclosure level may also be affected by factors such as 
the CEO’s ability to communicate clearly or choice of accounting principles. However, as this study 
is concerned with the effects of the extent and nature of IPO prospectus disclosures, the disclosure 
index methododology fulfils the study’s requirements satisfactorily. 
There are no widely accepted theoretical guidelines for selecting the items that make up a disclosure 
index (Beattie et al., 2004). Therefore, the successful use of the disclosure index methodology 
depends on critical and cautious selection of items (Marston and Shrives 1991). According to Bukh 
et al. (2005) the choice of items in the applied disclosure index of this study was based on a 
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thorough inspection of the literature on corporate disclosure (cf. Eccles and Mavrinac 1995, AICPA 
1994, Beattie and Pratt 2002) and intellectual capital reporting (Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Mouritsen 
et al., 2003; Sveiby, 1997). Regarding intellectual capital statements, the experiences and results of 
the major Danish project concerning intellectual capital statements (Mouritsen et al., 2003) were a 
major source of insight. 
In this study of the extent of disclosure of non-accounting information – e.g. information on 
knowledge-based resources, strategy and processes – in Japanese IPO prospectuses, a disclosure 
index consisting of 78 items divided into 6 different categories was applied. All the items in the 
disclosure index are listed in Appendix 1. The descriptive statistics on the item-level of the 
disclosure index is not discussed further in this paper.  
The contents of each IPO prospectus were compared to the items on the disclosure scoreboard and 
coded as 1 or 0, depending upon whether the IPO prospectus contained or did not contain the 
voluntary disclosure. Accordingly, the extent of disclosure was quantified as the percentage of 
recorded information items found in the prospectus. This can be seen in the following formula, 
which was used to calculate the index score of each IPO prospectus: 
DISCi = ( / M) ×100%, 
 
where di expresses itemi with the value found in the IPO prospectus in question otherwise 0. M 
expresses the maximum of information disclosed in the IPO, which could be 78 items. The analysis 
of the disclosure scoreboard for this study is additive and unweighted following the path of the 
studies conducted by Adrem (1999), Meek et al. (1995) and Cooke (1989). All three studies 
referred to Spero’s (1979) empirical findings that weighting of information is not relevant for 
several reasons. The most important one is to decrease subjectivity, which would be the case if 
applying special weights for different items, as the user’s preferences are unknown. Hence, either a 
company discloses a voluntary item in its IPO prospectus or not, which shows that the number of 
items measures the amount of disclosure. No ranking list for the importance of different items is 
applied nor is the number of words about an item used. This procedure is corroborated by the 
criticisms discussed in the study by Hackston and Milne (1996). 
 
3.2	   Data	  sample	  and	  descriptive	  statistics	  
For the purpose of this study of the effects of disclosure on long-term performance and bid-ask 
spread as proxies for information asymmetry and cost of capital a number of previous studies were 
1
m
i
i
d
=
∑
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considered. Data from Professor Jay Ritter2 showed that there is a marked difference between the 
general underpricing level of Japanese IPO’s in the pre late 1980’s period and post late 1980’s 
period in relation to the amount of companies going public. From this study’s dataset it was thus 
decided to focus on 2003, because it represents a stratified sample (cf. Konijn 1973) both in relation 
to the amount of IPO’s3; and the general level of underpricing4. Finally, 2003 was a normal year 
according to the business cycle and not be affected by crisis effects. 
The data for this study consists of all IPO prospectuses from stock exchange listings at the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange in the period 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2003. The 120 IPO prospectuses 
analyzed were obtained from EOL online systems. Prospectuses disclosed in connection with 
capital increases, cross-listing arrangements and companies issuing preferred shares only were 
excluded as well as stock index funds, life investment funds and real estate unit funds. The sample 
of IPO’s is dispersed across a range of industrial classification. Table 1 below classifies the number 
of IPO prospectuses available for analysis by industrial classification. The table illustrates that 
technology companies comprise 33% of the sample, while consumer goods companies comprise 
30% of the sample.  
 
Six-sector 
breakdown Nikkei Industrial classification N 
Percentage 
of sample 
Technology 
Pharmaceuticals, Electric Machinery, 
Automobiles & Auto parts, Precision 
Instruments, Communications 
 
  
37 30.83% 
 
  
Financials Banking, Other Financial Services, Securities, Insurance 
    
4 3.33% 
  
  
Consumer Goods Fishery, Foods, Retail, Services 
 
  
40 33.33% 
 
  
Materials 
Mining, Textiles & Apparel, Pulp & 
Paper, Chemicals, Petroleum, Rubber, 
Class & Ceramics, Steel, NonFerrous 
Metals, Trading Companies 
    
17 14.17% 
  
  
Capital Construction, Machinery, Shipbuilding, 
 
  
                                                
2 Jay Ritter’s website contains a multitude of background information on global IPO’s and background statistics. See: 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ 
3 In 2003 there were 120 IPO’s on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, while the average of the 20 year period from 1987 to 
2006 was 118 
4 In 2003 the average level of underpricing was 45,1 % on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, while the average of the 20 year 
period from 1987 to 2006 was 38,3% 
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Goods/Others Transportation Equipment, Other 
Manufacturing, Real Estate 21 
17.50% 
 
  
Transportation/    
Utilities 
Railway & Bus, Land Transport, 
Marine Transport, Air Transport, 
Warehousing, Electric Power, Gas 
    
1 0.83% 
  
  
Table 1: Industrial classification of data sample 
 
Due to the statistical test performed below the companies were divided into three groups according 
to the level of disclosure as follows: 
1) The first and second tertile number of total index level was identified, measuring the extent 
of total disclosure as well as in six subcategories: Employees, Customers, IT, Processes, 
Research and Development, and Strategic Statements. 
2) The first tertile number is stretches over low and medium groups, therefore we assign the 
first tertile number into the low group if the first tertile number below 33.3% percentile is 
more than the one above 33.3% percentile. The second tertile number is also stretches over 
medium and high groups, therefore we assign the second tertile number into the medium 
group if the second tertile number below 66.7% percentile is more than the one above 66.7% 
percentile. Hence we ended up with a high, medium, and low disclosure group. 
3) The number of items disclosed in the sub-indices Customers, IT, and Processes were 
generally smaller, and therefore, when testing the disclosure effects it was necessary to 
divide these into only two separate side groups characterized by high and low disclosure 
according to the number of disclosed items. The identical dividing method is applied by 
using the medium number of those three subcategories’ items. 
 
Type   Total Employee Customer  IT Processes R&D Strategic Statements 
Low disclosure   
42 43 53 85 91 56 43 
Medium disclosure   
47 50 
- - - 
14 23 
High disclosure   
31 27 67 35 29 50 54 
Total sample  
120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
 
Table 2: The number of companies in each disclosure group 
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In table 3 below, the descriptive statistics for the population is shown.  
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of overall disclosure 
 
3.3 Statistical	  model	  
In order to answer the hypotheses set out in the theoretical section of this paper, two types of tests  
were applied to the data. These are described separately in the next two sections concerning long-
term performance and bid-ask spreads.  
 
 
Long-term performance 
In table 5 below all the variables applied in the statistical testing of the relationship between 
disclosure and long-term performance are described in detail.  
 
Variable Description 
LTPi Difference between the initial offering price and the closing price on the day of the 
three-year anniversary for firm i, expressed as a percentage of the initial offering 
price 
DISCi The total disclosure of firm i, expressed as a percentage of the total disclosure 
index 
CARRPi Cumulative Average Returns, Reference Portfolio 
Table 4: Summary variables and their proxy measure determination 
 
For the purpose of answering hypotheses 1a and 1b, a two-sample t test with unequal variances for 
the total index (extent; hypothesis 1a) and for each sub-index (nature; hypothesis 1b) was applied. 
Testing for underpricing required measuring the three-year stock-price performance variance 
between high and low disclosure level firms. For the analysis, there was an initial choice between 
calculating the abnormal long-term stock performance by using both the standard market model and 
the reference portfolio model. In the standard market model the excess long-term stock returns 
would be compared against the Tokyo Stock Price Index, commonly known as TOPIX, which 
tracks all domestic companies of the exchange's First Section and in the reference portfolio model 
the excess long-term stock returns would be compared against a reference portfolio.  
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Studies by Barber and Lyon (1997) or Kothari and Warner (1997) have previously indicated that the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) compared against market performance may result in 
misspecification. This problem implies that the statistical Type I error is more likely, or that the null 
hypothesis (that the abnormal return equals zero) is rejected more frequently by chance alone. In 
Japan, previous research has also indicated that using the abnormal return (AR) with the TOPIX 
benchmark often has a positive bias. Hence, it was choosen to calculate AR against the mean return 
of the reference portfolio in order to avoid misspecification problems. This reference portfolio is 
based on two major risk factors found in the stock samples, namely book-to-market ratio and firm 
size. The procedures employed in the construction of the reference portfolio are as follows: 
(a) First all stocks were identified, which were listed during the same month that each IPO 
occurred. These stocks were divided into five groups based on firm size to define the 
boundaries of each quintile. 
(b) Within each quintile, the stocks were further sorted into five groups based on the book-to-
market ratio to define the boundaries of the inner quintile, creating twenty-five cells. Each 
IPO firm’s stock performance was compared to the average stock performance of firms in its 
corresponding cell, yielding its abnormal return. 
 
Bid-ask spread 
In order to answer hypotheses 2a and 2b, a two-sample t test was applied with unequal variances for 
the total index (extent; hypothesis 2a) and for each sub-index (nature; hypothesis 2b). In testing for 
bid-ask spread we measured one-year average closing bid-ask stock-price contrast between high and 
low disclosure level firms, as depicted in section 3.2 after the IPO. 
The bid-ask spread is calculated with the following formula:  
Bid-ask spread = (closing bid price - closing ask price) / closing stock price. 
In table 5 below all the variables applied in the statistical testing of the relationship between 
disclosure and bid-ask spreads and their specific determination, are described in detail. 
 
Variable Description 
DISCi The total disclosure of firm i, expressed as a percentage of the total disclosure 
index 
BAS1YRAVGi The one-year average bid ask spread 
Table 5: Summary variables and their proxy measure determination 
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4. Results	  	  
Long-term performance 
Table 6 shows the three-year abnormal return of both high and low total disclosure group as well as 
the following subcategories: Employees, Customers, IT, Processes, Research and Development, and 
Strategic Statements. In regards to total disclosure level, the three-year abnormal return of the high 
disclosure group is 99.15%, which is larger than that of the low disclosure group that is equivalent 
to 28.78%, at a 5% significance level. This result supports the H1a, which addresses that the extent 
of voluntary disclosure level is positively associated with the long-term performance of the stock. 
In regards to subcategory Employees, the three-year abnormal return of high disclosure group 
111.24% is greater than that of low disclosure group, being 29.68%, with a 1% significance level. 
For subcategories IT and Process, the three-year abnormal return of high disclosure group 85.91% 
and 77.99% is insignificantly greater than that of low disclosure group 63.67% and 67.67%, 
respectively. However, in regards to subcategory Research and Development, the three-year 
abnormal return of high disclosure group 45.38% is smaller than that of low disclosure group 
90.70%, with a 10% significance level. Additionally, for subcategories Customers and Strategic 
Statements, the three-year abnormal return of high disclosure group 63.07% and 60.85% is 
insignificantly smaller than that of low disclosure group 78.66% and 82.75%. Therefore, the results 
for the subcategories Employees, IT and Processes mean that  H1b must be rejected. From the result 
of the total disclosure level, it can be concluded that employee related disclosure are the key factor 
of predicting the long-term performance of IPO’s. 
  
Average low 
disclosure 
group 
Average 
high 
disclosure 
group 
Significance Comments 
Total index 28.78% 99.15% Pr(T < t)=0.0072 Very significant and a positive relation 
Employees 29.68% 111.24% Pr(T < t)=0.0038 Very significant and a positive relation 
Customers 78.66% 63.07% Pr(T < t)=0.5065 No difference, slightly opposite sign 
IT 63.67% 85.91% Pr(T < t)=0.4238 No difference, slightly positive sign 
Processes 67.67% 77.99% Pr(T < t)=0.7390 No difference, slightly positive sign 
R&D 90.70% 45.38% Pr(T < t)=0.0332 Significant and opposite sign than expected 
Strategic 
statements 82.75% 60.85% Pr(T < t)=0.4302 
No difference, slightly 
opposite sign 
 
Table 6: Results of Cumulative Average Returns to Reference portfolio 
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Bid-ask spread 
Table 7 shows the one-year average bid-ask spread of both the high and low total-disclosure groups 
as well as the following subcategories: Employees, Customers, IT, Processes, Research and 
Development, and Strategic Statements. In regards to total disclosure level, the one-year average 
bid-ask spread of high disclosure group 1.370% is smaller than that of low disclosure group 
1.726%, with a 10% significant level. This result supports the H2a, which addresses that the extent 
of voluntary disclosure level is inversely associated with the bid-ask spread. 
In regards to the subcategory Customers, the one-year average bid-ask spread of high disclosure 
group is calculated to 1.341%, and this is significantly smaller than that of low disclosure group, 
1.642%, on a 5% significance level. For the subcategories Employees, IT, Research and 
Development, and Strategic Statements, the one-year average bid-ask spread of the high disclosure 
group 1.436%, 1.409%, 1.363% and 1.475% is insignificantly smaller than that of low disclosure 
group 1.701%, 1.500%, 1.486% and 1.564%, respectively. However, in regards to the subcategory 
Processes, the one-year average bid-ask spread of high disclosure group 1.476% is insignificantly 
greater than that of low disclosure group 1.473%. Therefore, it can be concluded that the result for 
the subcategories Customers (significant), Employees and IT (insignificant) imply that H2a must be 
rejected. Together with the result of the total disclosure level, it is possible to conclude that 
customer related disclosure is a key factor of reducing the information asymmetry problem 
surrounding IPO’s. 
  
Average low 
disclosure 
group 
Average 
high 
disclosure 
group 
Significance Comments 
Total index 1.726% 1.370% Pr(T < t)=0.0603 Very significant and a positive relation 
Employees 1.702% 1.436% Pr(T < t)=0.1882 No difference, slightly positive sign 
Customers 1.641% 1.341% Pr(T < t)=0.0259 Very significant and a positive relation 
IT 1.500% 1.410% Pr(T < t)=0.5638 No difference, slightly positive sign 
Processes 1.473% 1.476% Pr(T < t)=0.9888 No difference, slightly opposite sign 
R&D 1.486% 1.363% Pr(T < t)=0.3493 No difference, slightly positive sign 
Strategic 
statements 1.564% 1.475% Pr(T < t)=0.5574 
No difference, slightly 
positive sign 
 
Table 7: Results of One-year Average Bid-Ask Spread 
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5.	  Discussion	  and	  concluding	  remarks	  
In the literature there has historically been some disagreement as to the relationship between 
disclosure levels and their effects on the performance of IPO’s. While Loughran and Ritter (2004) 
argue that higher disclosure levels lead to poorer stock price performance for IPO’s, Schrand and 
Verrecchia (2004) demonstrate that the opposite, namely that greater disclosure frequency in the 
period prior to the IPO is associated with lower cost of capital in the form of lower bid-ask spreads 
and lower analyst forecast dispersion. The focus in this paper is not so much concerned with the 
effects of voluntary disclosures on the short-term characteristics of IPO’s like for example 
underpricing, This study’s focus is on the value of a set of information that is concerned with the 
long-term value creation and financial sustainability of a company, namely intellectual capital. As 
such, this paper is concerned with understanding how to facilitate the capital market in picking the 
best stocks on the long-term; using long-term oriented data.  
 
Discussion	  of	  long-­‐term	  performance	  results	  
Intellectual capital was found to have a significant effect on the long-term stock price performance 
of our IPO population and as such hypothesis H1a holds. Hence, investing in companies that are 
transparent about their value creation and softer values including for example details about their 
strategy, business models, human resources and other parameters of intellectual capital through a 
more active disclosure policy will lead to a significant over-performance in returns in comparison to 
those companies that do not.  
The analysis also reveals that with regard the nature of the disclosures, especially the employee 
category is the main driver of the significant result of hypothesis H1a. The composure of the 
disclosures concerning employee-related intellectual capital by the companies that have high 
disclosure ratios concentrate on aspects such as: Staff breakdown by department, employee 
expenses in relation to number of employees, statements of policy on competence development, 
recruitment policies, remuneration and incentive systems and finally dependence upon key 
personnel. As such it can be concluded that the resources described above are central elements of 
importance for companies in order to execute a long-term strategy. Typically IPO prospectuses 
contain a thorough description of strategic direction to reach the main financial goals of the 
company (cf. Bhabra and Pettway 2003, 370; Tokyo Stock Exchange 2012).   
The results imply that companies who disclose the intellectual capital information relating to the 
employee category thereby signal to the capital market that they have a plan for managing these 
resources. As such this study confirms the conclusions of Sakakibara et al. (2010) whose findings 
confirm that analysts would find this data relevant and be prone to use it if it were provided. This 
also means that the results of this study are in opposition to the propositions of Healy and Palepu 
(2001, 426) who suggest that voluntary disclosures such as customer satisfaction and human capital 
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do not carry value by themselves and that only management forecasts as a voluntary item increases 
the predictability power of stock price returns. Normative researchers such as Healy and Palepu 
(2001) are missing the point that these types of disclosures concerning employees also play an 
important role in the creation of accountability of the signals from the management team (Murthy 
and Mouritsen, 2011). Furthermore, the findings from this study are also very much in line with the 
suggestions made by Mouritsen and Larsen (2005) who argue for the importance of creating levers 
of control on such unstable resources as human capital and competences. Indicating to have an 
understanding and a plan for managing these resources simultaneously signals the ability to over-
perform the market.  
For analysts and investors this means that in order to identify stocks that outperform the market, 
they will need to gain insight into the companies’ proposed platform for executing strategy, for 
example by asking themselves whether the company has the correct composition, alignment and 
incentivized human resources to leverage the described strategy? In addition, it is also imperative 
that the company has the right incentive systems for retaining these human resources from moving 
to competitors. In an acquisition setting, Ranft and Lord (2000) confirm that retention of specific 
types of human capital is critical for determining success in terms of future performance. More 
interestingly, they stress that soft incentives such as autonomy, status, and commitment 
significantly affect retention, but economic incentives do not.  
Surprisingly, the R&D category had an opposite sign than expected. The analysis revealed a 
significant difference where the low disclosure group had almost double the long-term performance 
of the high disclosure group, namely 90,7% versus 45,8%. This may indicate that there is a higher 
risk ascertained to R&D disclosures, such as statements of policy, strategy and objectives of R&D, 
R&D expenses and R&D investments in product development and design as well as patents. This is 
interesting, as we initially expected a positive view of activities that have the objective to sustain 
corporate profitability in the long term. Previous evidence provided by Eberhart et al. (2004) in a 
non-IPO setting, suggest that increases in R&D spending are beneficial to investors although the 
market is slow at recognizing this information. The alternative explanation in the IPO setting of this 
study, however, may be that the companies included in this study are revealing too much 
information in their prospectuses and by doing so, they have pushed too much of this information 
into the stock price, in turn leaving no room for positive surprises. Companies that on the other 
hand do not reveal too much of this information will more likely experience that the information is 
incorporated into the stock price in a gradual manner, thus increasing stock price returns. The 
synthesis of this discussion is that if companies only reveal R&D expenditures, then the market will 
incorporate them gradually, however, if the company discloses sufficient information for the 
investors to understand the reasons behind these activities, this information is incorporated into the 
stock prices straight away.  
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This reveals that the capital market is very focused and perhaps also very bullish on information 
such as R&D spending, R&D strategy and patents. It may be speculated that it is in general easier 
for analysts and investors to understand and relate information on R&D, like for example patents 
and R&D spending to cash flow predictions than some of the other information categories of the 
intellectual capital index such as employee resources, internal processes, customer loyalty etc. At 
the same time, the fact might be weary that the analysts and investors may be prone to include this 
information in an uncritical manner. Perhaps they put too large values into their spreadsheets or not 
discounting enough for the risks ascertained to R&D uncertainties. Faulkner (1996) accentuates this 
view in his criticism of the use of DCF models for valuing R&D projects, and concludes that real 
options theory is a much more appropriate tool for such purposes 
 
Discussion	  of	  results	  concerning	  bid-­‐ask	  spreads	  
Higher disclosure of intellectual capital affects bid-ask spreads positively, when measured on the 
one-year average of trading. Thus indicating that information on intellectual capital is a significant 
component for investors when they are assessing information asymmetries. Accordingly, this 
voluntary information reduces ex ante uncertainty and thereby also the cost of capital of IPO 
companies. The fact that information on intellectual capital disclosed in the prospectus prior to the 
IPO has a significant long-term effect on the cost of capital must be explained by the higher 
transparency of the company. It is interesting that the companies in the high disclosure group are 
able to sustain this advantage over such a long period. This has two possible explanations. The first 
one is that it takes time to change the information supply of a company, perhaps because it is 
strongly rooted in corporate culture as is vastly suggested in the corporate communications 
literature. The other explanation is the reputational effect of transparency and that it is difficult to 
alter the capital market’s perception of this; at least in the short term.  
Almost all of the subcomponents of the intellectual capital index had the correct sign in the bid-ask 
analysis. However, it was the customer component was the main driver of the overall index, it being 
both positive and significant. The primary types of information disclosed were customer segment 
information and information on customer intimacy. Customer segment information is important for 
creating transparency about the strength of the various segments and our findings contradict those 
of Ali et al. (2009) who indicate, that companies with strategic competitive advantages attempt to 
protect their market shares by disclosing less information. This segment information also conveys a 
more detailed understanding of how the company differentiates its offerings between customer 
groups, in turn illustrating the company’s ability to fine-tune in its strategies to fit customer groups. 
This information is important for investors in estimating how the company will generate revenues in 
the future and thus also the future cash flow and particularly financial analysts spend time digging 
into such matters.  
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Customer intimacy, which here covers over aspects such as descriptions of customer relationships, 
customer involvement and dependence upon key customers, is also a part of making the analysts 
and investors feel secure about the future cash flow of the company, in turn reducing the cost of 
capital. This is because there are strong ties between sustained higher operating profitability and 
strong customer relationships and organizational structures that support these (cf. Gosman et al. 
2004). Interestingly one component of the customer subcategory was surprisingly not disclosed 
upon to any extent, namely market share. Market share could be very useful for the capital market, 
because it is an easy way to estimate future revenues. However, the lack of this information could 
be due to two factors. Firstly, the IPO’ing companies may have difficulties in projecting their 
market share going forward as they are entering into a new era with the company. Secondly, this 
may be due to reasons of secrecy. Harris (1998) and Ali et al. (2009) confirm this speculation in 
finding that firms, regardless of the competitive landscape, are reluctant to provide e.g. segment 
disclosures for the fear of losing both abnormal profits and market share.  
 
Concluding	  remarks	  
In summary, the contribution of this study was to examine the effects of voluntary disclosures on 
intellectual capital on the long-term performance of the stock price subsequent to the introduction 
on the stock exchange as well as the companies’ cost-of-capital, estimated through statistical tests 
on bid-ask spreads. The findings are discussed above against recent findings and lead us to conclude 
that:  
- IC voluntary disclosure is generally relevant information for investors who assess the 
company’s long-term performance. If IC information were to be provided it would clearly 
be an advantage for investors to make use of it for their decision-making. In regards to total 
disclosure level, the three-year abnormal return of the high disclosure group is 99.15%. This 
result is significantly larger than that of the low disclosure group being equivalent to 
28.78%. We found the evidence consistent with Bessler and Bittelmeyer (2008) and Guo et 
al. (2005). 
- Both employee and R&D related information are IC information. However, they are 
incorporated quite differently into long-term stock prices by investors. Employee-related 
intellectual capital are key resources for companies to execute their long-term strategy; 
therefore investors gradually evaluate this type of information and whether companies have 
an understanding and a plan for managing these resources to reach the strategic goal 
(Mouritsen and Larsen 2005). Our evidence shows if a company discloses more information 
about employees, it creates credibility for its competence of executing a long-term strategy.  
This signals the ability to over-perform the market. On the other hand, R&D information is 
also a core element for companies, however this type of information helps investors estimate 
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cash flow or revenue predictions. Therefore investors might have pushed too much of this 
type of information into the stock price in the short term, in turn leaving no room for 
positive surprises. Eberhart et al. (2004) showed that the market is slow at recognizing the 
extent of beneficial R&D investment when a company only discloses R&D cost 
information. Our findings are consistent with Eberhart et al. (2004) and provide further 
evidence that if a company discloses more R&D information, it might help investors 
estimate R&D driven cash flow predictions in the short term.  
- Voluntary IC disclosure generally reduces information asymmetries surrounding IPO and 
this effect is persistent in the long term. In regards to total disclosure levels, the one-year 
bid-ask spread of the high disclosure group is 1.370%. This result is smaller than that of the 
low disclosure group that is equivalent to 1.726%. This evidence is consistent with Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1991) and Verrecchia (2001). 
- Customer related information is important for investors to estimate how a company will 
generate revenues in the future. Investors would gain confidence about future revenues if a 
company discloses information about its major customers as well as customer involvement 
and customer relationships. Gosman et al. (2004) showed that the pricing of major 
customers is consistent with the market recognition of sustainable operating profitability. 
Our findings are consistent with Gosman et al. (2004) and provide further evidence that if a 
company discloses more customer-related information, it enhances its transparency and 
narrows the bid-ask spread in turn lowering the cost of capital in the long run. 
Looking at prospects for future research it seems potentially advantageous to study this 
phenomenon over the whole business cycle, i.e. to create a longitudinal database. This would enable 
us to determine whether there is a business cycle effect on the importance of IC for investment 
decisions and corporate transparency. Also, understanding the importance of IC from the 
perspective of capital markets is an important element of the on-going integrated reporting 
initiatives (cf. IIRC 2012). Finally, there is a stream of upcoming research on the importance of 
business models for capital allocation and investment decisions. In order to contribute meaningfully 
to this field, studies such as the one conducted here would need to include a focus on the profit-
formula of the company and how strategic partnerships are leveraged to create value across the 
value chain.  
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Appendix	  1	  
% of companies 
making disclosure 
% of companies 
making disclosure 
Employees (27 items) 11,7 IT (5 items) 10,6 
Staff breakdown by age 0,8 Description & reason for investments in IT 13,8 
Staff breakdown by seniority 0,0 IT systems 22,0 
Staff breakdown by gender 0,0 Software assets 10,6 
Staff breakdown by nationality 0,0 Description of IT facilities 4,9 
Staff breakdown by department 22,0 IT expenses 1,6 
Staff breakdown by job function 8,9   
Staff breakdown by level of education 3,3 Processes (8 items) 4,7 
Rate of staff turnover 1,6 Efforts related to the working 
environment, 
0,0 
Comments on changes in number of 
employees  
8,1 Information and communication within the 
company 
4,1 
Staff health and safety 1,6 Working from home 0,0 
Education and training expenses/number of 
employees 
0,0 Internal sharing of knowledge and 
information  
14,6 
Staff interview 0,8 Measure of internal or external failures 0,0 
Statements of policy on competence 
development 
39,0 External sharing of knowledge and 
information 
12,2 
Description of competence development 
program and activities 
14,6 Fringe benefits and company social  
programs 
3,3 
Education and training expenses 0,0 Environmental approvals and 
statements/policies 
3,3 
Absence 0,0   
Employee expenses/number of employees 67,5 Research & Development (9 items) 17,6 
Recruitment policies 53,7 Statements of policy, strategy and/or 
objectives of R&D activities  
47,2 
HRM department, division or function 0,8 R&D expenses 35,0 
Job rotation opportunities 1,6 R&D expenses/sales 2,4 
Career opportunities 2,4 R&D invested in basic research 12,2 
Remuneration and incentive systems 49,6 R&D invested in product 
design/development 
20,3 
Pensions 0,8 Future prospects regarding R&D 7,3 
Insurance policies  2,4 Details of company patents 9,8 
Statements of dependence on key personnel 33,3 Number of patents and licenses etc, 10,6 
Revenues/employee 3,3 Patents pending 13,8 
Value added/employee 0,8   
  Strategic statements (15 items) 18,1 
Customers (14 items) 14,2 Description of new production technology 35,0 
Number of customers 2,4 Statements of corporate quality 
performance 
11,4 
Sales breakdown by customer 24,4 Strategic alliances  40,7 
Annual sales pr, segment or product 88,6 Objectives and reason for strategic 
alliances 
26,0 
Average customer size 7,3 Comments on the effects of the strategic 
alliances 
9,8 
Dependence on key customers 39,8 Description of the network of suppliers 
and distributors 
74,8 
Description of customer involvement 6,5 Statements of image and brand  23,6 
Description of customer relations 17,1 Corporate culture statements 0,8 
Education/training of customers 3,3 Best Practise 5,7 
Customers/employees 0,8 Organisational structure 27,6 
Value added pr, customer or segment 0,8 Utilisation of energy, raw materials and 
other input goods 
0,8 
Market share (%) 1,6 Investment in the environment 5,7 
Relative market share  0,8 Description of community involvement 3,3 
Market share, breakdown by 
country/segment/product 
4,1 Information on corporate social 
responsibility and objective 
4,9 
Repurchase 0,8 Description of employee 
contracts/contractual issues 
0,8 
 
Appendix 1: The disclosure index with corresponding disclosure percentages per item 
 
